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I. INTRODUCTION
The environment in which American students attend public
schools has changed dramatically over the past thirty years.  Students
today attend school in the shadow of perennial school shooting mas-
sacres, interact with law enforcement officers permanently patrolling
their halls, and may be exposed to drug and gang activity never con-
templated when their parents or grandparents were students.1  One of
the most dramatic, and constitutionally significant, changes affecting
students today is the reshaped landscape of how students are disci-
plined2 by various state actors,3 both in and out of school.
When a student4 is accused of committing an offense at school, the
matter may be adjudicated in three distinct venues—within the school
itself, through a juvenile court proceeding, or in adult criminal court.
Depending upon the forum and the type of sanction imposed, one of
three very different theoretical models will apply.  Each model be-
stows a particular set of procedural and substantive constitutional
rights upon the accused.  This Note labels these three models the
Criminal Punishment Model,5 the Juvenile Justice Model,6 and the
1. James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tolerance, 10
KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 369, 369 (2000) (“Despite recent statistics showing a de-
crease of student violence in our public schools, isolated incidents of extreme vio-
lence and loss of life have occupied the public consciousness . . . . Statistics
notwithstanding, students in public schools fear for their own personal safety.”).
2. This Note uses the term “discipline” to refer to a panoply of methods by which
students are accused, adjudicated, and sanctioned.  As discussed infra Part II,
the label that attaches to the form of discipline, and the state actor administering
it, can critically affect a subject student’s rights.
3. For authority holding that public school officials are state actors, see infra note
81.
4. This Note uses the term “student” to refer to an American juvenile attending
public school.
5. The term “criminal punishment” can be seen as definitionally redundant given
that the imposition of punishment is the sole criterion by which a sanction is
determined to be “criminal.” See infra note 21.  Nevertheless, this Note employs
the label given the Supreme Court’s implied willingness to consider certain
school sanctions as punishment while simultaneously rejecting the label of “crim-
inal.” See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
6. Though this Note employs the names “Criminal Punishment” and “Juvenile Jus-
tice” for these respective Models, the labels are, by no means, uniform throughout
the published corpus on the topic.
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School Discipline Model.7  This Note examines what rights and reme-
dies attend each model, how these models interact, and, most impor-
tantly, how they have changed over the past fifty years.  This Note
posits that a confluence of trends has made it more likely that stu-
dents subject to school discipline will be transferred or passed between
models, almost always resulting in the imposition of a more punitive
sanction upon the student.  Despite the increasing fluidity with which
students may be transferred between models, students’ rights remain
rigidly affixed within each model.
This evolution in the treatment of students has been labeled in a
myriad of works and publications as the “school-to-prison pipeline.”8
While this research trail is well-trodden, much of its focus has been on
the impact of such trends, particularly its disparate application to cer-
tain minority groups of students.9  This Note attempts to identify the
conceptual framework underlying the school-to-prison pipeline via an
analysis of the rights attendant to the above-described models.  De-
pending upon which model applies, certain constitutional protections
may be due the accused student.  Correspondingly, the state may be
limited in the type and nature of sanction it may impose.
While both the Criminal Punishment and Juvenile Justice Models,
and their attendant rights, have been extensively discussed by both
legal scholars and courts of law,10 the School Discipline Model re-
mains relatively undefined, both in its parameters and the rights due
students within it.11  This Note also attempts to more fully articulate
7. This Note uses the term “School Discipline Model” to refer primarily to the codes
of conduct and their corresponding sanctions imposed upon students by public
school districts in the United States.
8. See, e.g., Dean Hill Rivkin, Decriminalizing Students with Disabilities, 54 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 909, 911 n.5 (2009) (“The school-to-prison pipeline refers to systemic
policies and practices that push our nation’s schoolchildren, especially at-risk
children, out of classrooms and into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.”);
Chauncee D. Smith, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating School-to-Prison
Pipeline Equal Protection Cases Through a Structural Racism Framework, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2009) (“The phrase ‘school-to-prison pipeline’ con-
ceptually categorizes an ambiguous, yet seemingly systematic, process through
which a wide range of education and criminal justice policies and practices collec-
tively result in students of color being disparately pushed out of school and into
prison.”).
9. For an overview of some of the relevant literature, see infra notes 139–85.
10. For one of the most comprehensive articulations of these two models, see Martin
R. Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for As-
sessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1982).
11. This dearth of conceptual analyses is likely attributable to courts’ extreme defer-
ence to school authorities in disciplining students.  See infra note 76 for a discus-
sion of this deference.  As such, school disciplinary authority operates in a
relative vacuum of constitutional guidance. See infra notes 124–80 and accompa-
nying text.  This is not to say that the history and constitutional limits of school
discipline have gone unexamined.  For a thorough legal and historical analysis of
school discipline, see Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline
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the School Discipline Model, primarily through the analysis of two
landmark Supreme Court cases: Goss v. Lopez12 and Ingraham v.
Wright.13  Through these two cases, the School Discipline Model is re-
vealed as one in which students, though entitled to a modicum of con-
stitutional oversight, are at the behest of school officials, who exercise
near total discretion in the types of sanctions imposed and whether or
not the student is ultimately referred to law enforcement or the juve-
nile justice system.14
Seen through the framework of these three models, the school-to-
prison pipeline is best understood as a consort of state policies and
practices that ease and encourage the transfer of students between
models, generally away from school discipline towards criminal pun-
ishment.15  Consequently, this transfer tends to reduce or eliminate
rehabilitation opportunities for offending students, in favor of sanc-
tions more punitive in character.  This Note finally argues that these
effects are undesirable and counterproductive as a means of maintain-
ing the school environment and preparing a student for life as a func-
tional citizen within our democracy.16
Policies Turned into a Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity Grounded in Brown v. Board of Education, 9 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 289 (2005).  However, most of the relevant literature has not
attempted to articulate a conceptual framework for school discipline, as has been
extensively done with both juvenile justice and criminal punishment. See supra
note 10.
12. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
13. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
14. This referral effects a transfer of the student from the School Discipline Model to
either the Juvenile Justice or Criminal Punishment Models.  Though not exten-
sively discussed in this Note, it is entirely possible, even likely, for students to be
sanctioned in both the School Discipline Model and one of the other two models
for the same offense. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.  In fact, the refer-
ral in and of itself can be considered a school discipline sanction if it results in the
deprivation of the student’s education comparable to a suspension.  See infra
notes 84–102 and accompanying text for a discussion of out-of-school suspension
as a deprivation of students’ property interest in their education.  However,
juveniles can only be sanctioned either in juvenile or criminal court for certain
offenses, but not both. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra subsection II.B.3 and section III.B.
16. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1340 (2000) (noting that one traditional goal of public schools has been to teach
students “to be responsible and participatory members of society”); id. at 1429
(“[M]any educational philosophies stress the importance of preparing students
for their lives as adults by providing not only analytical training but also the
social skills and habits needed to become productive and responsible members of
a democratic society.”).
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II. THREE MODELS FOR REGULATING JUVENILE CONDUCT
A. The Criminal Punishment Model
1. Rights Attendant to the Criminal Punishment Model
Throughout American history, courts have struggled to define the
concept of criminal punishment.17  Attempting this challenge is not
simply an esoteric exercise in judicial philosophy.  Rather, under-
standing the framework by which the state imposes a restraint upon
one of its citizens is a critical determination.  Only if the actions taken
or threatened by the government constitute the imposition of punish-
ment is the offender entitled to certain constitutional protections.
Critically, the government may not be constitutionally required to
prove the elements of its charges against a defendant beyond a reason-
able doubt.18  As its text indicates, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment only applies to actions labeled as such,
and not, for instance, to government-imposed treatment for mental ill-
ness, regardless of the unpleasantness it incidentally imposes.19  Ad-
ditional rights only applicable to punishment include the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantees against self-incrimination and double jeop-
ardy,20 the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial, and the right to
counsel.21  Additionally, only criminal punishment is subject to the Ex
Post Facto Clause, which prohibits punishment for conduct that oc-
17. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 49–52.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (emphasis added));
see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 & n.39 (1977) (finding the Eighth
Amendment inapplicable to school discipline, because “an imposition must be
‘punishment’ for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to apply”); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 528 (1979) (“The pretrial detainees whose rights are at
stake in this case . . . are innocent men and women who have been convicted of no
crimes.  Their claim is not that they have been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment . . . but that to subject them to any form of punishment at all is an
unconstitutional deprivation of their liberty.”).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V  (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . . .”); see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
369–70 (1997) (holding that the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy did not apply to a Kansas sex-offender registry because the  registry was
non-penal; therefore, its imposition did not constitute a second prosecution). But
see J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework
for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 382 n.10 (1976) (“The double
jeopardy clause has been restricted to ‘criminal’ punishment despite the lack of
an explicit textual reference to criminal prosecutions.” (citing JAY A. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 39 (1969))).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Generally,
criminal law is identified and distinguished by its imposition of punishment.  As
discussed by Professor Gardner:
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curs prior to the enactment of the conduct’s proscription.22  Finally,
individuals have a liberty interest in being free from punishment and,
thus, are entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
prior to punishment’s imposition.23
2. A Framework for Recognizing Criminal Punishment
Given the extensive constitutional implications of the state’s impo-
sition of punishment, a clear analytical framework for determining
when state action constitutes punishment is critical.24  Nonetheless,
the United States Supreme Court has struggled for well over one hun-
dred years to provide a workable definition of state-imposed punish-
The best candidate for a conceptual proposition about the criminal law is
that the infliction of “punishment” is sufficient to render a legal process
criminal in nature.  In the United States, the labeling of a process as
“criminal” triggers certain basic constitutional guarantees, such as the
right to counsel and the right to a jury trial.  As a test for when processes
are criminal, the Supreme Court unhesitatingly invokes the concept of
“punishment” as the relevant criterion.  That a sanction is inflicted in
the criminal courts for a violation of the criminal code is sufficient to
classify the sanction as “punitive,” but there are recurrent problems in
assessing the punitive nature of other sanctions, such as administrative
commitment, expatriation, deportation, fines for custom violations and
the deprivation of social security benefits.  That the legislature has iden-
tified these sanctions as civil in nature does not control the constitu-
tional issue, for if the sanction is “punitive,” if it constitutes
“punishment,” then regardless of the legislative label, the process is
criminal and the constitutional guarantees apply.  If we wish to under-
stand the criminal law, we must first understand its most prominent
feature: the infliction of punishment.
Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth
Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1, 12 n.44
(2012) (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408–09 (1978)).
In this sense, the presence of punishment, or lack thereof, defines when an act is
considered “criminal.”
22. See U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
law.”); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369–71 (holding that neither the constitutional pro-
hibition against double jeopardy nor the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to a Kan-
sas sex-offender registry because the registry was non-penal; thus its imposition
did not constitute a second prosecution, and the Ex Post Facto Clause applies
“exclusively to penal statutes” (citing Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S.
499, 505 (1995))); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that termina-
tion of a deported citizen’s social security benefits was not “punishment” and,
therefore, could be imposed for conduct predating the relevant statute without
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause).
23. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process
Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 20, at 383 (extolling upon the need to distinguish be-
tween punishment and regulatory fines or forfeitures, so that affected citizen’s
rights are clearly defined).
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ment.25  However, certain principals can be gleaned from the Court’s
oeuvre addressing the concept of punishment.26  A synthesis of rele-
vant case law reveals that the Court will find a sanction to be punitive
under the following conditions:
(1) If the sanction is labeled punitive by the legislature, it is conclusively pre-
sumed to be so.
(2) If the legislative label or intent indicates that the sanction is “civil,” it will
be presumed to be so unless it is shown “by the clearest proof” to be punitive
under the following conception of punishment:
(a) The sanction involves an unpleasant restraint purposely imposed by the
state;
(b) The sanction is imposed upon a person because of an offense;
(c) The sanction is imposed to achieve the purposes of punishment—retri-
bution and deterrence;
(d) The extent and duration of the unpleasant restraint is known, within
some possible limits, at the time of its imposition; and
(e) The sanction is generally imposed upon offenders deemed to be
blameworthy.27
As to (2)(c)’s question of intent, the Supreme Court stated in Bell v.
Wolfish: “[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a
legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly
may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detain-
ees.”28  Thus, a legislature’s stated purpose of an imposed sanction
would not necessarily be controlling.  Also noteworthy is the fact that
under this framework, the question of legislative intent asks whether
the legislature’s stated intent can be ascertained as its actual intent
based upon the design of the sanction.  Any finding that the legisla-
ture did not actually intend the sanction to be punishment is conclu-
sive evidence of non-punishment, as accidental punishment is
logically impossible under this framework.29
25. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Gardner, supra note 21,
at 13 & n.46 (“The Court first attempted to define punishment in mid-nineteenth
century cases arising under the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses.”);
Clark, supra note 20, at 382 (“The Court has never developed a principled expla-
nation of why identical sanctions should trigger certain criminal constitutional
safeguards but not others.”).
26. For an extensive discussion of the Court’s development of this case law, see Gard-
ner, supra note 10, at 797–822.
27. Gardner, supra note 21, at 15–16.
28. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
29. Accidental punishment would lack the requisite intention to inflict the retribu-
tion or deterrence required by the Court’s framework.  Thus, courts must avoid
the temptation to determine punishment by the effect of the sanction upon the
offender. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 17 n.61 (“If punishment is defined solely
in terms of the impact of a sanction on its recipient, without regard to questions
of motivation for imposing it, virtually all coercive sanctions would become puni-
tive, thus making it impossible to draw necessary distinctions be-
tween . . . punishment and coercive rehabilitation.”); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 19–31 (1968) (discussing why the “impact the-
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B. The Juvenile Justice Model
1. Rehabilitative Beginnings
In contrast to the defining punitive characteristic of the Criminal
Justice Model,30 the Juvenile Justice Model began solely with a reha-
bilitative purpose.31  Rather than impose punishment as retribution
for an offense,32 the Juvenile Justice Model, informed by the social
science of the time, viewed youth offenders as possessing a condition
in need of correction.33  The reasoning, still applicable today, was that
because of their youth and continuing development, juveniles were
more amenable to rehabilitation and less of a threat to society at large
than offending adults.34  The procedural structure of this model was
the near opposite of the adversarial system that defined adult crimi-
nal courts.35  Collecting information about the child was prioritized so
that the judge, ostensibly possessing especial knowledge of child de-
velopment, could better render an appropriate “diagnosis.”36  Because
the ultimate issue was the child’s welfare and rehabilitation, juries
and lawyer-advocates were seen as inapposite, and the judge was to
ory” of identifying punishment is insufficient). But see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether the [constitutional ban
on cruel and unusual punishment] has been violated should turn on the character
of the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it.”).
30. However, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
9–10 (1976), for a discussion about the influence of the rehabilitative model in the
criminal justice system during the latter half of the Twentieth Century. See also
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 823–24 (1988)
(describing the creation of the juvenile justice system as part of a broad progres-
sive effort to reform the entire justice system into more rehabilitative model).
31. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 141 (1997) (“The creation at the turn of the century of a separate system of
juvenile justice, committed to rehabilitation of young offenders, was a product of
the social reform movement of that period.”).
32. Prior to the creation of separate juvenile courts of justice at the dawn of the twen-
tieth century, juvenile offenders received the same criminal adjudication as adult
offenders, although a common law “infancy defense” existed.  Andrew Walkover,
The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 509–12
(1984).
33. Feld, supra note 30, at 824 & n.9; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 79 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[A] juvenile proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is
the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal
court.”).
34. Feld, supra note 30, at 824.
35. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 150 (1984) (“[The juvenile court] modified courtroom
procedures to eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding.”).
36. Id.
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sit next to the child to lend the proceedings an air of informality.37
Sentences were indeterminate, based solely upon the particular needs
of the child, and not influenced by the alleged offense.38
2. Recognizing Due Process Rights in Juvenile Justice
This rehabilitative model operated in nearly every state for much
of the twentieth century.  However, beginning in the 1960s, a “renais-
sance of retribution”39 fundamentally changed how juvenile courts
treated and sentenced youth offenders.40  Instead of solely perceiving
youth offenders as bearing a condition in need of treatment, juvenile
courts, increasingly throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, began to pre-
scribe sentences so as to make juvenile offenders answer for their
crimes.41  This change in sentencing can be seen in the use of back-
ward-looking factors in determining sentences, specifically the nature
and perceived heinousness of the crime, and the record of the con-
victed offender.42
As juvenile courts grew increasingly punitive, courts of law began
to recognize additional constitutional protections due juvenile offend-
ers.43  In a series of cases spanning thirty years, the United States
Supreme Court recognized a number of constitutional safeguards due
youth defendants in juvenile court.44
37. Gardner, supra note 21, at 9 (“The proceedings were themselves deemed rehabili-
tative, with the judge acting as a father figure ready to sit next to the youth and
‘on occasion put his arm around his shoulders and draw the lad to him’ in a show
of ‘care and solicitude.’” (quoting Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV.
L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909))); Feld, supra note 30, at 150–51.
38. Feld, supra note 30, at 150–51.  Both of these characteristics speak to a rehabili-
tative purpose, and their converse, a sentence for a specific amount of time deter-
mined by the nature of the offense, would be characteristic of multiple factors
indicating criminal punishment. See supra text accompanying note 27 (“The
sanction is imposed to achieve the purposes of punishment—retribution and de-
terrence . . . [and] [t]he extent and duration of the unpleasant restraint is known,
within some possible limits, at the time of its imposition . . . .”).
39. See Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution—An Examination of Do-
ing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781 (1976).
40. Feld, supra note 30, at 151 (“Despite occasional challenges and criticism of some
conceptual or administrative aspects of juvenile justice, no sustained and system-
atic examination of the juvenile court occurred until the 1960s.”).
41. Gardner, supra note 21, at 22–23.
42. Id. at 23–24.
43. Feld, supra note 30, at 151 (describing the “due process revolution” that shifted
“the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into a legal institution”).
44. Debate remains as to whether the Court’s recognition of constitutional rights due
youth offenders in juvenile proceedings was an acknowledgement of the punitive
nature already present in the juvenile system, or if the Court’s decisions caused
the juvenile justice model to assume additional punitive characteristics. Com-
pare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1967) (holding that juvenile offenders are
entitled to due process, in part, because of the similarities between the juvenile
and criminal court models), with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger,
2016] SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 773
One of the first cases to mark the sea change in juvenile rights was
In Re Gault,45 in which the Court found that juveniles facing incarcer-
ation in a juvenile facility were entitled to due process prior to convic-
tion.  The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that juveniles be granted notice of charges, and
be able to confront, cross-examine, and call witnesses.46  Additionally,
juveniles possess a right to counsel, which flows from the Fifth
Amendment, because juvenile proceedings are so analogous to crimi-
nal proceedings.47  In so holding, the Court implicitly conveyed a deep
skepticism of the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system.48  At
the very least, this finding is a tacit, but inescapable, acknowledge-
ment that the Court regarded the juvenile system as a mixture of pun-
ishment and rehabilitation.49
Shortly thereafter, the Court applied similar reasoning in In Re
Winship.50  There, the Court held that the government, in a juvenile
proceeding, is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prove each element of an alleged offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt if the alleged offense would be considered criminal if
committed by an adult.51  The Court found that this requirement is
imposed to protect the accused from the stigma and risk of lost liberty
carried by a conviction.52  Even though these factors are equally pre-
J., dissenting) (“I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to transform
juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well on the way to
accomplishing.”); Feld, supra note 30, at 141 (describing Gault as “precipitat[ing]”
the “procedural revolution that . . . transformed the juvenile court” into a model
more closely resembling a criminal proceeding).
45. 387 U.S. 1; see Feld, supra note 30, at 151 (identifying Gault as the first case of
the “due process revolution” of the juvenile court); see also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (holding that juveniles have a right to “the essentials of
due process and fair treatment” before being waived from juvenile to adult court).
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 12–48.
47. Id. at 47–49.
48. Id.
49. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 823–25 (noting that, though Gault refused to hold
juvenile proceedings constituted punishment, the conclusion “that the Court saw
the sanction imposed in Gault as punitive is difficult to avoid”).  See Gardner,
supra note 21, at 18–22, for an explanation as to why a sanction cannot simulta-
neously be imposed as punishment and rehabilitation for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis.
50. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
51. Id. at 365–66 (“We made clear in [Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do
not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
courts, for a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seri-
ousness to a felony prosecution.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
52. Id. at 367 (“[I]ntervention [by a court] cannot take the form of subjecting the child
to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of
institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult.”).
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sent in criminal convictions that impose punishment, the Court
avoided finding that the juvenile system was punitive.53
Just one year later, the Court, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,54
abated its expansion of the rights required in juvenile proceedings
when it held that such proceedings do not constitutionally require a
trial by jury.55  In distinguishing the holdings in Gault and Winship,
the Court noted that the protections afforded in those cases worked to
ensure and promote accurate fact-finding.56  As jury trials did not con-
tribute to such a function, they were not constitutionally mandated at
the juvenile level.57
Four years later, the Court’s reasoning further aligned the juvenile
justice system with criminal punishment in Breed v. Jones.58  In
Breed, the Court found that because juvenile proceedings were suffi-
ciently analogous to those in adult criminal court, the proscription
against double jeopardy applied, and a juvenile could not be prose-
cuted subsequently in adult court after an adjudication in juvenile
court.59  In comparing the potential sanctions in criminal and juvenile
court, the Court concluded:
[I]n terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudica-
tory hearing such as was held in this case from a traditional criminal prosecu-
tion.  For that reason, it engenders elements of anxiety and insecurity in a
juvenile, and imposes a heavy personal strain . . . . Under our decisions we can
find no persuasive distinction in that regard between the proceeding con-
ducted in this case . . . and a criminal prosecution, each of which is designed to
vindicate the very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. . . . Jeopardy
attached when respondent was put to trial before the trier of the facts, that is,
when the Juvenile Court . . . began to hear evidence.60
53. Gardner, supra note 10, at 828.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
55. Id. at 534–41.  The Court held that jury trials were not required even if a convic-
tion could result in incarceration or the alleged offense would be considered a
crime if committed by an adult. Id.
56. Id. at 543 (“The requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examina-
tion, and standard of proof naturally flowed from [an emphasis on accurate
factfinding].  But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary
component of accurate factfinding.”).  Though acknowledging Gault’s finding that
the right against self-incrimination in juvenile proceedings does flow from due
process considerations, the Court omitted it when listing the rights identified in
Gault that emphasized accurate fact-finding. Id. at 532, 543.  See Gardner, supra
note 10, at 829–32 & n.224, for a discussion of the implications of the Court’s
refusal to address this irreconcilability between the McKeiver and Gault
decisions.
57. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. But see id. at 565–66 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(enumerating reasons why a jury trial might promote more accurate fact-finding
in the juvenile context).
58. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
59. Id. at 529–30.
60. Id. at 530–31 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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In reaching its conclusion, the Court did not cite to the Fifth Amend-
ment or considerations of due process, but rather to the lack of distinc-
tion between the criminal and juvenile justice models in the specific
context of placing the accused in “jeopardy.”61
3. A Retributive Renaissance in Juvenile Courts
As discussed in subsection II.B.2, in the 1970s, states began to leg-
islate a more punitive purpose for juvenile courts, far removed from
the purely rehabilitative purpose of their founding.62  Rather than
looking to rehabilitate an offender, new or amended laws and sanc-
tions were designed to make offenders, juvenile or otherwise, answer
for their crimes and deter future crime.63  States mainly employed
four “strategies” for shifting juvenile courts to a more retributive
model: (1) easing the requirements for waiving juvenile offenders into
adult court; (2) adding traditionally punitive purposes, such as of-
fender accountability, public safety, or retribution, to purpose clauses
of juvenile court statutes; (3) increasing the use of determinate sen-
tencing of juvenile offenders; and (4) mandating minimum sentences
for the conviction of specific offenses.64
States eased the process by which a juvenile is waived into adult
criminal court primarily through three methods: (1) expanding the
ability of juvenile court judges to waive students into criminal court
after an evidentiary hearing; (2) removing juvenile courts’ jurisdiction
based upon the age or alleged offense of the juvenile; and (3) allowing
state prosecutors discretion to “directly file” charges against juveniles
in adult criminal court by granting concurrent jurisdiction to juvenile
and adult courts over older juveniles charged with particular of-
61. See id.  For a discussion of the Court’s misapplication of the effect theory in Gault
and Breed, and why the Court would have found the sanctions at issue to be
punitive had it applied the proper analytical framework, see Gardner, supra note
10, at 832–33.  Gardner further summarizes Gault’s, Winship’s, McKeiver’s, and
Breed’s treatment of the punitive framework cited at supra note 27 thusly:
Gault, Winship, McKeiver, and Breed illustrate three manifestations of
punishment’s analytical role in juvenile cases.  In some instances, as in
Gault and Winship, the concept may operate merely as an alternative
means to obtain the same results yielded by the fundamental fairness
standard.  In other cases, however, as exemplified by McKeiver, different
outcomes may result depending upon whether fundamental fairness or
the concept of punishment is applied.  Finally, Breed suggests that cer-
tain issues are properly analyzed entirely in terms of the concept of pun-
ishment without reference to fundamental fairness.
Gardner, supra note 10, at 833.
62. See supra notes 39–42.
63. Gardner, supra note 21, at 22–23.
64. Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
323, 323–24 (1991).  Note how these four “strategies” align with the punitive
framework articulated in supra text accompanying note 27.
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fenses.65  The overall effect of these new waiver provisions was to pro-
vide states a variety of methods by which they could choose, or even
mandate, that a juvenile, whom the state previously would have
sought to rehabilitate, be subjected to a punitive sanction for his or
her offense.66
While enactments easing the waiver of juveniles into adult court
work to punish accused juveniles through adult sanctions, determi-
nate sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing laws introduce
punitive sanctions into the juvenile court itself.  On a theoretical level,
determinate sentence laws are the ultimate rejection of the rehabilita-
tive model.67  They remove any consideration for the needs of the ac-
cused or his or her amenability to rehabilitation.68  Rather, they are
solely concerned with the act committed and the accused’s prior
behavior.
Determinate sentencing laws, as adopted in several states, may
take the form of presumptive guidelines that depend on the accused’s
age, his record, and the seriousness of the offense.69  Alternatively, a
state may use “offense-based criteria,” including mandatory mini-
mums, with long sentences for serious offenses that grow proportion-
ately shorter for lesser crimes.70  Lastly, a state may retain overall
65. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and
LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 39–40 (2007); see also JOLANTA
JUSZKIEWICZ, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED? 1 (2000), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/59KV-TEMB (“[Measures passed by states to send more
youth to criminal court include]: lowering the age at which juveniles can be prose-
cuted as adults; greatly expanding the categories of crimes for which youth are
automatically prosecuted in criminal court; giving prosecutors the exclusive au-
thority to decide which juveniles are charged as adults; and limiting the discre-
tion of judges to overturn decisions by prosecutors and law enforcement
officials.”).  While many early laws establishing juvenile courts vested the courts
with absolute discretion to transfer a case to adult criminal court, the Supreme
Court held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) that juveniles were enti-
tled to several due process rights before transfer. See Forst & Blomquist, supra
note 64, at 338.  Despite these protections, the Court has not struck down any of
the increasingly popular waiver statutes, even though it may contain exceedingly
vague language. See id. (noting that since 1970, approximately half of the state
legislatures have passed new waiver provisions, many of which contained ex-
tremely vague language, such as “amenability to treatment,” “dangerousness,”
“protection of the public,” and “best interests of the public welfare”).
66. See also JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 65, at 4 (noting that in 2005, the prosecutor or
legislature—rather than a judge—decided whether to charge a juvenile as an
adult 85% of the time).
67. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 24–25 (“Clearly, the offense-oriented, determinate
sentencing movement constitutes a clear invocation of the punitive sanction, and
stands in stark contrast to the offender-oriented, indeterminate dispositional
scheme reflected in traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice.” (citation omitted)).
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 2010).
70. Gardner, supra note 21, at 24.
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indeterminate sentencing, but employ determinate sentences for re-
peat offenders or serious offenses.71
From their purely rehabilitative beginnings, juvenile courts in
America, both in their treatment and sentencing of juvenile offenders,
have incorporated several aspects of the criminal justice system and
its underlying punitive purpose.  Despite the increasing opportunities
for the visitation of punishment upon offending juveniles, a limited set
of constitutional protections, primarily grounded in the concept of due
process, attend juvenile proceedings in most states.
C. The School Discipline Model
1. Sparse Constitutional Origins
Unlike the designed and intentional beginnings of the juvenile jus-
tice system, the legal framework surrounding the regulation of stu-
dent behavior by school officials in American public schools developed
slowly and hesitantly in the face of the changing educational land-
scape.  For much of early American history, education was entirely
voluntary on the part of the student and his or her parents.72  Under
such a scheme, sending a child to school could be seen as an implicit
waiver of the student’s constitutional rights73 or a delegation of au-
thority from the student’s parents to the school officials.74  Whatever
the legal theory empowering officials in early American schools, stu-
dents for much of the nation’s history enjoyed virtually no constitu-
71. Id.
72. See David B. Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory
Schooling, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 355, 361–62 (1976) (noting that public attitudes
in America did not significantly shift in favor of compulsory education until late
into the nineteenth century).
73. A similar, though distinct, argument theoretically could apply today to students
attending private American schools in which the officials are private employees
and not state actors.  See infra note 81 for a discussion of public school officials as
state actors.
74. A school official (or any agent) so authorized by such a delegation is said to act in
loco parentis.  The Court specifically rejected the notion that this type of author-
ity applies to public school students viz a viz school officials.  New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (“[The reasoning of in loco parentis] is in tension
with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”).  Though the Su-
preme Court has never explicitly held that school officials historically acted in
loco parentis, at least one member of the Court has advocated for a “return” to
such a legal standard for all public school students. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 383 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a search of a student, though violative of the Fourth Amendment, should be
upheld under an in loco parentis standard); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
410–22 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating for an application of an in
loco parentis standard to public school students as grounds for overturning prior
constitutional limits on school officials’ conduct (citing Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114 (1859))).
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tional rights while at school.75  Considering this absence of
constitutional protections, there should be little surprise that the
United States Supreme Court and the judiciaries of nearly all states
have shown a strong aversion to defining the rights of students in pub-
lic schools.76  This aversion has resulted in a near absolute deference
to school officials in maintaining discipline in schools as they see fit.77
Arguably, the first case to signal a willingness by the Court to
forego this deference was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District.78  In Tinker, the Court held that public students
were entitled to certain First Amendment rights while in school.79
The Court subsequently found that students, while in school, also en-
joyed limited Fourth Amendment protections in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.80  In both cases, the Court held that for constitutional pur-
poses, school officials were state actors.81  While the cases represented
a dramatic acknowledgement of previously unrecognized rights, the
protections the Court articulated were substantially reduced from
75. See Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847,
847–48 (2011), for a discussion of the various theories cited by the Court for re-
jecting certain constitutional protections for public school students.
76. This deference to school officials additionally demonstrates deference to the legis-
lative branch of state governments, as school districts and their legal authority
exist as grants of state power and are manifestations of a state’s right to educate
its citizens. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (“Judicial interposi-
tion in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems
requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities.”); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and
of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools.”); J.P. ex rel. A.P. v. Millard Pub. Schs.,
285 Neb. 890, 899, 830 N.W.2d 453, 461 (2013) (“A school district is a creature of
statute and possesses no other powers other than those granted by the Legisla-
ture.”).  In this sense, deferring to the authority of school officials upholds the
tenets of both the separation of powers and, in the case of federal courts,
federalism.
77. See supra note 76; infra subsection II.C.3.
78. 393 U.S. 503.
79. Id. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”).
80. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
81. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—
Boards of Education not excepted.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
336–37 (noting that because school officials are subject to the First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of their students, they are subject to certain Fourth
Amendment rights as well (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Goss, 419 U.S. 565; Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977))).
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those enjoyed by citizens in a general public context.82  Though some
speculated at the time that these cases heralded a shift in the judici-
ary’s approach to public schools, subsequent cases have generally
shown that the Court’s reluctance to interfere in school officials’ main-
tenance of the school environment remains resolute.83
2. Students’ Rights and Punishment in Schools
Given its reluctance to interfere in the school environment, there
should be little surprise that the Court has struggled to define the
constitutional rights of students in regards to school-imposed sanc-
tions.84  Two cases, in particular, demonstrate the difficulty exper-
ienced by the Court in assessing a school’s ability to punish its
students in light of the judiciary’s strong reluctance to interfere in the
workings of public schools: Goss v. Lopez85 and Ingraham v. Wright.86
The end result is that while students are entitled to a limited set of
rights flowing from the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the
vitality of these rights to limit or police abusive school disciplinary
practices is highly questionable.
a. Goss v. Lopez
In Goss, the Court considered what, if any, due process rights were
owed Ohio school students subjected to ten-day school suspensions.87
The students in the case had been suspended for destruction of school
property and refusal to disperse from a gathering upon official instruc-
82. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech.”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–41 (holding that
searches of students by school officials require neither prior obtainment of a war-
rant nor probable cause, but simply must be “reasonable[ ] under all the
circumstances”).
83. See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the
1990s and Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 122–30 (1993) (“After T.L.O., courts have
generally upheld school searches and seizures.  Of twenty-three post-1985 cases
that addressed the issue of reasonable suspicion, only three cases held that the
school officials lacked reasonable suspicion to search a particular location.”).
84. While both Tinker and T.L.O. dealt with students subjected to school sanctions,
this Note focuses on the rights specifically attendant the procedures immediately
preceding an imposition of a student sanction.
85. 419 U.S. 565.
86. 430 U.S. 651.
87. While a school suspension may seem a trivial sanction compared to the potential
incarceration and deprivations of liberty discussed in the preceding sections of
this Note, the Court has held, and this Note argues, that suspension is a serious
sanction to visit upon a student of any age considering its implications for the
student’s education. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he total exclusion from the
educational process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.”).
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tion to do so.88  At the time, state law made education compulsory for
the students and authorized high school principals, within their com-
plete discretion, to suspend students without a prior hearing.89  The
Court concluded that because Ohio law extended compulsory educa-
tion to all students, the defendants had a property interest in their
education.90  Additionally, the students possessed a liberty interest in
their reputations,91 which they risked losing due to the suspensions.92
Because of these interests, the students were constitutionally due
some process before their deprivation, rather than “any procedure the
school [chose] no matter how arbitrary.”93
The Court determined that students were due, at a minimum, an
informal notice and a hearing regarding the suspension.94  Rather
than a formalized proceeding, the notice simply needed to inform the
student of the alleged infraction, and a hearing needed only be an in-
formal opportunity for the accused student to tell his or her version of
the relevant events.95  The Court stated these two requirements
could, and most often would, occur simultaneously,96 and that most
88. Id. at 569–70.
89. Id. at 570–73 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.66, 3313.48, 3313.64 (1972 &
Supp. 1973)).
90. Id. at 573–74.  The Court rejected an argument from the State of Ohio that the
students possessed no such interest in their education because they had no con-
stitutional entitlement to it. Id. at 572–73 (“ ‘[Protected interests] are created
and their dimensions are defined’ by an independent source such as state stat-
utes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits.” (quoting Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))).
91. Id. at 574–75 (“ ‘Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him,’ the minimal requirements
of the [Constitution] must be satisfied.” (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1971))).
92. Id. (“If sustained and recorded, [the charges of misconduct precipitating the sus-
pension] could seriously damage the students’ standing with their fellow pupils
and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher educa-
tion and employment.”).
93. Id. at 576.  In so holding, the Court noted that a ten-day suspension of a student
is “not de minimis,” considering that “education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
94. Id. at 581–82.
95. Id.  The Court also rejected the argument that judicial review of the suspension
pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (West 1973) provided the requisite
process for two reasons: (1) the judicial review was deferential to the determina-
tion of the suspending principal; and (2) there was no stay of the suspension
pending review. Goss, 469 U.S. at 581 n.10.  Thus, there may be deprivation of
protected interests in the meantime, for which the student would have no re-
course. Id.
96. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582 (“[T]he disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred.  We hold only that, in
being given the opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion,
the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the
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prudent school districts would already be following these
procedures.97
The Court opined that the procedures imposed would not consti-
tute an undue burden on school districts, and the school district that
was a party to the litigation already possessed substantially similar
procedures.98  Apparently eager to avoid burdening the school system
with subsequent expansions of students’ rights,99 the Court listed
some of the rights to which students were not entitled prior to a
suspension:
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide,
that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student
the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the
incident.100
In reaching this holding, the Court noted that further constitu-
tional requirements may strain school resources and, in so doing, re-
duce the efficacy of suspension as a tool for maintaining discipline
sufficient to outweigh suspension’s benefits to the school environ-
accusation is.”).  The Court held that while “as a general rule [the] notice and
hearing should precede removal of the student,” those students who present “a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process” could be removed immediately, but the requisite hearing and
notice should follow as soon as practicable afterwards. Id. at 582–83.
97. Id. at 583 (“[W]e have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than a
fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair
suspensions.”).
98. Id.  This acknowledgement by the Court begs the question why the Court decided
to enumerate these rights if they were already being observed, given the strong
judicial deference to school officials in maintaining the school environment.  Ad-
ditionally, one struggles to think of a circumstance in which an even quasi-com-
petent school official would suspend a student without informing him or her as to
why and hearing what the student’s response might be.  In that sense, the Court
broke substantial ground to judicially mandate common sense.
99. Id. at 578 (“We are also mindful of our own admonition: ‘Judicial interposition in
the operation of the public schools raises problems requiring care and re-
straint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of local and state authorities.’” (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 104 (1968))).
100. Id. at 583.
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ment.101  In this sense, the Court validated the ten-day school suspen-
sion as a tool for maintaining school discipline.102
b. Ingraham v. Wright
Ingraham was a suit brought by students who had been corporally
punished by school officials in Florida.103  The students alleged that
the corporal punishment was both cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment and a violation of their due process
rights to notice and a hearing, as mandated by Goss v. Lopez.104  The
Court recognized that while Florida law specifically authorized corpo-
ral punishment,105 school officials additionally possessed a common
law right to punish corporally.106  Thus, even though only twenty-one
101. Id. (“To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources,
cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness.  Moreover, further for-
malizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary na-
ture may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”).  In acknowledging this balance,
the Court noted that suspensions longer than ten days and expulsions may re-
quire additional due process protections. Id. at 584 (“We should also make it
clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceed-
ing 10 days.  Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school
term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.  Nor do we put aside
the possibility that in unusual situations, although involving only a short suspen-
sion, something more than the rudimentary procedures will be required.”).
102. Id. at 580 (“Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain
order but a valuable educational device.”).
103. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977).  The Court noted that the punish-
ments administered by the school at issue appeared to be “exceptionally harsh” in
relation to the rest of the district. Id. at 657.  The beatings caused one student to
suffer a hematoma that required medical attention and prolonged convalescence
away from school.  Another student temporarily lost the use of one arm. Id.
104. Id. at 653–55.  For a discussion of Goss, see supra text accompanying notes
87–102.
105. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 655–56 & n.6 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1961)).
Though not all schools administered the punishment, per internal policies, those
that did were bound by three statutory safeguards:
(1) The use of corporal punishment shall be approved in principle by the
principal before it is used, but approval is not necessary for each specific
instance in which it is used.
(2) A teacher or principal may administer corporal punishment only in
the presence of another adult who is informed beforehand, and in the
student’s presence, of the reason for the punishment.
(3) A teacher or principal who has administered punishment shall, upon
request, provide the pupil’s parent or guardian with a written explana-
tion of the reason for the punishment and the name of the other [adult]
who was present.
Id. at 655 n.6 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27).
106. Id. at 659–61 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134, *453; 3 id. at
*120; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 147(2), 153(2) (1965)).  In examining
teacher authority to punish, the Court acknowledged that such authority was not
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states at the time explicitly authorized corporal punishment by school
officials, such punishment was available in all states that did not spe-
cifically prohibit the practice.107  This common law right also gave stu-
dents a cause of action for damages if the punishment proved
excessive.108
The Court first rejected the argument that corporal punishment,
as administered in this case, constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment.109  The Court examined the
drafting history of the Eighth Amendment to determine that the
drafters intended the amendment to apply only to criminal punish-
ment.110  Distinguishing types of punishment as either criminal or
non-criminal runs counter to the bulk of relevant scholarship, which
holds that the imposition of punishment is the defining criterion of
criminality.111  Nevertheless, the Court distinguished school punish-
ment from criminal punishment on the differing characteristics be-
tween the school and prison environments.112  Because of these
a delegation of parental authority, but flowed from the state’s power to educate
its citizens and to maintain group discipline in doing so. Id. at 662.
107. Id. at 662–64.  At the time, only two states—Massachusetts and New Jersey—
statutorily barred corporal punishment by teachers. Id. at 663.  Today, at least
twenty-two states expressly prohibit the practice by statute, and several more
have implicitly outlawed it, for example through limiting the use of force by
school officials to self-defense.  C.C. Swisher, Constitutional Abuse of Public
School Students: An Argument for Overruling Ingraham v. Wright, 8 WHITTIER J.
CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 54–55 (2008) (enumerating the school corporal punish-
ment laws of almost every state in the Union and several school districts).  Even
in states whose statutory schemes expressly permit or are silent as to corporal
punishment, many school districts prohibit or simply do not practice it. Id. at
55–58.
108. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663–64.  Factors to be considered in determining exces-
siveness include the child’s past attitude and behavior, “the nature and severity
of the punishment, the age and strength of the child, and the availability of less
severe but equally effective” disciplinary measures. Id. at 662 (citing 1 FOWLER
V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., LAW OF TORTS § 3.20 (1st ed. 1956); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150, cmts. c–e).
109. Id. at 664 (“We adhere to this longstanding limitation and hold that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining
discipline in public schools.”).
110. Id. at 665 (“Although the reference to ‘criminal cases’ was eliminated from the
final draft, the preservation of a similar reference in the preamble indicates that
the deletion was without substantive significance.  Thus, Blackstone treated each
of the provision’s three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal proceedings and
judgments.” (citation omitted) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*297, *379)).
111. See supra note 21.
112. The Court stated:
The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circum-
stances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarcer-
ation.  The prisoner’s conviction entitles the State to classify him as a
“criminal,” and his incarceration deprives him of the freedom “to be with
family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of nor-
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inherent differences, the Court concluded, “[W]hen public school
teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment,
the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable.”113
The Court next considered the students’ claims that the beatings
were a deprivation of their due process rights, as articulated in Goss v.
Lopez.114  While the Court recognized that students possess a liberty
interest in being free from punishment, Goss’ hearing and notice re-
quirements were inapplicable because the punishment at issue (corpo-
mal life.”  Prison brutality . . . is “part of the total punishment to which
the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper
subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” . . .
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.  Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the pub-
lic school remains an open institution.  Except perhaps when very young,
the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school
hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to
return home.  Even while at school, the child brings with him the sup-
port of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other
pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669–70 (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915
(5th Cir. 1976)).  While the Court’s imagery reaches the obvious conclusion that
school-imposed corporal punishment is generally far less severe than adult incar-
ceration, and avoids the arguably absurd result of requiring jury trials and ap-
pointed counsel prior to the imposition of school punishment, the Court’s
approach to distinguishing criminal sanctions from school punishment provides
insufficient theoretical criteria for future cases reminiscent of Justice Stewart’s
infamous declaration “I know it when I see it.”  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Additionally, the Court cited several prior
Eighth Amendment cases to support its assertion that the amendment only ap-
plied in a criminal context. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667–68 (“In the few cases
where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the
criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no diffi-
culty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable.” (citing Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugaje-
witz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959))).
However, those cases more closely adhered to the proper theoretical framework
in that they determined whether the sanction imposed was punishment, not
whether it was criminal. See, e.g., Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39 (“It is well settled that
deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punish-
ment.” (emphasis added)); Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 81–82 (recognizing that confine-
ment for contempt is a civil compulsion to comply with a court order without
distinguishing criminality and punishment).  In this sense, the Court may have
done better in Ingraham to hold that the beatings were not punishment at all,
because they lacked the requisite retributive character. See supra text accompa-
nying note 27.  Under this theory, corporal punishment may be rehabilitative in
that it is designed to correct the child’s behavior to allow the child to take full
advantage of the educational environment.  The Court alluded to such a notion
when distinguishing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), later in the opinion. See
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 n.43 (“The purpose of corporal punishment is to cor-
rect a child’s behavior without interrupting his education.”).
113. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671.
114. Id. at 672–74.
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ral punishment) did not constitute a substantial deprivation, as did
the punishment in Goss (suspension), and, thus, the students’ prop-
erty interests were not implicated.115  Therefore, the only question
was whether the students were deprived of a due process interest in
being free from punishment.116  As to the question of the students’
substantive rights, the Court determined that so long as the punish-
ment remained “reasonable”117 and within “the limits of the common-
law privilege,”118 there was no substantive violation.119
In addition to the question of substantive rights, the Court con-
cluded that students were entitled to certain procedural safeguards to
“minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the resolu-
tion of disputed questions of justification.”120  However, the Court
held that, since the protected liberty interest was defined by its histor-
ical limitations,121 the common law remedies available and the statu-
tory protections122 afforded students provided sufficient protection.123
Further, the Court noted that any additional safeguards, though po-
115. Id. at 674 & n.43 (“That corporal punishment may, in a rare case, have the unin-
tended effect of temporarily removing a child from school affords no basis for con-
cluding that the practice itself deprives students of property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
116. Id. at 674.
117. Id. at 675–76 (“[T]here could be no recovery [at common law] against a teacher
who gave only ‘moderate correction’ to a child.  To the extent that the force used
was reasonable in light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather ‘justifiable
or lawful.’”).
118. Id. at 676 (“[Reasonable corporal punishment] represents the balance struck by
this country between the child’s interest in personal security and the traditional
view that some limited corporal punishment may be necessary in the course of a
child’s education.  Under that longstanding accommodation of interests, there
can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal pun-
ishment is within the limits of the common-law privilege.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 675–76.
121. Id. at 675 (“Because it is rooted in history, the child’s liberty interest in avoiding
corporal punishment while in the care of public school authorities is subject to
historical limitations.”).
122. The Court recognized that under the common law and Florida statutes, a student
would have a claim for damages against a teacher who inflicted excessive punish-
ment. Id. at 676–77.  If the punishment were inflicted with malice, the teacher
would potentially be subject to criminal prosecution. Id.
123. Id. at 678 (“In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated, the availa-
ble civil and criminal sanctions for abuse—considered in light of the openness of
the school environment—afford significant protection against unjustified corpo-
ral punishment.  Teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict corporal
punishment unnecessarily or excessively when a possible consequence of doing so
is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against them.”).  Additionally,
the Court held that the civil penalties afforded students distinguished the case
from Goss, which held that hearings were required prior to the imposition of a
ten-day suspension. Id. at 678 n.46 (discussing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975)).
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tentially helpful in averting future abuse or wrongfully inflicted beat-
ings, would likely outweigh the cost to school discipline.124
3. What Goss and Ingraham Tell Us About Students’ Rights in
School
The Court’s approaches in Goss and Ingraham, as evinced by the
Ingraham Court’s repeated attempts to distinguish Goss,125 are irrec-
oncilable in at least one respect.  While both cases involved disputed
school disciplinary practices, in which the Court heard evidence that
internal procedures were not observed, the Goss Court found it neces-
sary to establish a due process standard,126 even though it was almost
certainly being met by nearly all school districts already.127  Con-
versely, Ingraham found that due process protections were inapplica-
ble precisely because safeguards were already in place.128  Though the
Ingraham Court attempted to distinguish Goss, it is difficult to see
Ingraham as anything except a rejection of the Goss Court’s willing-
ness to prescribe constitutional standards in regulating the school
environment.
Despite this fundamental contradiction, certain inferences can be
gleaned from the two decisions.  First, the Court’s traditional aversion
to interfering with school discipline remains almost categorical.  In
Goss, the Court only mandated extremely minimal procedures that
were almost certainly effected already, while in Ingraham, the Court
took pains to avoid any insertion of judicial authority into school disci-
pline, despite the somewhat gruesome nature129 of the injuries.130
124. The Court cited several reasons why a teacher, though he or she may believe they
are justified in administering corporal punishment, may impose some less effec-
tive means of maintaining discipline in order to avoid a hearing, such as the risk
of losing the respect of the students if the teacher’s request to administer the
punishment were to be denied. Id. at 680–81 & n.50.  The Court’s concern that a
teacher may be overruled in a hearing seems to imagine a much more elaborate
proceeding than the one actually described in Goss. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 582
(“In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the al-
leged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred.  We hold only
that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this dis-
cussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of
the accusation is.”).
125. See supra notes 114–19, 123 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 103.
130. One example of how the Court’s analysis faltered in attempting to justify its hold-
ing is in its use of a problematic Fourth Amendment analogy. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679–80 (1977).  The Court likened its view of the common
law remedies for corporal punishment to the ability of peace officers to make war-
rantless arrests at common law despite the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.  In this sense, both the school official’s and the arresting of-
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Additionally, the Court regards the spheres of criminal punishment
and school punishment as entirely separate;131 thus, students’ consti-
tutional protection from punishment must flow from due process,
rather than the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In summary, the Court’s articulation of rights due students in pub-
lic schools has been slow and reluctant over the pasty fifty years.
Even when the Court holds that students are entitled to constitutional
protections, the rights outlined are often minimal and far reduced
from those enjoyed by the students outside of the school context.  Fur-
thermore, the Court’s mandate of certain rights has, at times, been
marked by a subsequent retreat or scaling-back of its willingness to
interfere with school officials’ discretion to maintain the school envi-
ronment.132  The end result is that students in public schools are gen-
erally disciplined at the complete discretion of school officials.  Any
judicial protections of students must come from their minimal due
process interests or some state-mandated judicial remedy.
III. THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE
As discussed by this Note, the Criminal Punishment, Juvenile Jus-
tice, and School Discipline Models are theoretically distinct and mutu-
ally exclusive concepts.  Each model carries certain attendant rights
and very different underlying motivations.  Despite these jurispruden-
tial partitions, the American public high school student may find him-
self adjudicated under any three of these models.133  The punishment
or sanction imposed can substantially deprive the student of his inter-
est in education, reputation, or freedom from punishment.134  Indeed,
ficer’s determinations are subject to judicial scrutiny to safeguard constitutional
rights. Id. at 679–80 & n.48.  The dissent correctly responded by noting that a
warrantless arrest is but “the first stage of an elaborate system of procedural
protections” and that “The Constitution requires the State to provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause by a judicial officer prior to the imposi-
tion of any significant pretrial restraint of liberty other than a brief period of
detention.” Id. at 698–99 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 & n.27 (1975)).
Such safeguards are a “probable-cause determination prior to any significant pe-
riod of pretrial incarceration, rather than a damages action or suppression hear-
ing, that affords the suspect due process.” Id. at 699.  Thus, while a subsequent
probable cause determination for a warrantless arrest prevents the substantial
infringement of constitutional rights, a subsequent damages action for wrongful
corporal punishment merely compensates for a liberty interest deprivation al-
ready suffered.
131. See supra note 113.
132. See supra notes 83, 126–30 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 14.
134. See supra section II.C.
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such a deprivation can further hinder a student’s ability to succeed in
the classroom and after exiting the education system.135
Recent trends in the administration of school discipline have
caused the practical boundaries of the three models to grow less dis-
tinct.  The result is that students in public schools are more likely to
incur concurrent sanctions in both the education and either the juve-
nile or criminal spheres.  Additionally, as the character of the juvenile
court has grown more punitive, students are left with fewer opportuni-
ties for rehabilitation.  Certain in-school conduct, which might previ-
ously have been considered typical adolescent behavior, now warrants
referral to the juvenile system.136  Three recent trends in public school
discipline are primarily responsible for the criminalization of student
conduct: (1) the proliferation of “zero-tolerance policies;” (2) addi-
tional—often mandatory—referral of students to the juvenile justice
system; (3) and the expanding prevalence of “school resource officers”
(SROs) in schools.137
A. Zero-Tolerance Policies
A zero-tolerance policy is any law or regulation that “mandates
predetermined consequences or punishments for specific offenses.”138
Although, the 1990s saw a decrease in overall school violence,139 zero-
tolerance policies gained popularity, primarily in response to the spate
of horrific school shootings that occurred during that period.140  In
this regard, the policies were intended, ostensibly, as a student-safety
mechanism, which would remove dangerous students from the envi-
ronment as soon as the school became aware of the threat they
posed.141
The forerunner for the proliferation of zero-tolerance policies was
the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.142  The Act essentially required
states, under pain of losing substantial federal education funding, to
135. See, for example, Jessica Feierman, Marsha Levick & Ami Mody, The School-to-
Prison Pipeline . . . and Back: Obstacles and Remedies for the Re-Enrollment of
Adjudicated Youth, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1115 (2009), for a discussion about the
difficulties experienced by students reintegrating into the school environment af-
ter their release from juvenile detention facilities and alternative education
programs.
136. See infra section III.B.
137. Deborah N. Archer, Introduction: Challenging the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 868–71 (2009).
138. Hanson, supra note 11, at 301 n.32 (quoting PHILLIP KAUFMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 121
(1998)).
139. Peden, supra note 1, at 369.
140. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 303.
141. Id. at 302.
142. Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994) (recodified at 20 U.S.C. § 7151
(2010)).
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enact legislation mandating the expulsion of any student found to
have knowingly brought a firearm to school.143  All fifty states subse-
quently enacted the legislation.144  In 2001, the No Child Left Behind
Act expanded the 1994 Act, requiring states to mandate expulsion for
any student who possessed a firearm at school.145
These initial zero-tolerance policies mandated severe punishments
for students bringing firearms into the school environment, which can
be seen as a logical response to the perceived increase in gun violence
in schools.146  However, since the 1994 Act, school districts and legis-
latures have enacted zero-tolerance policies that contemplate a host of
juvenile transgressions far more benign than the firearm violations
originally contemplated.147  These policies progress from the obviously
violent to the arguably trivial.  The expansion began with non-firearm
weapons, such as brass knuckles,148 and quickly encompassed drug
possession on school property,149 gang-related activities,150 tobacco
and alcohol violations,151 and even tardiness or truancy.152
The end result of zero-tolerance policies is a pantheon of transgres-
sions that automatically result in the offending student’s extended re-
moval from the educational environment.  Often, the acts warranting
this removal would be considered pedestrian juvenile misbehavior—
actions meriting correction, but whose commission does not arouse im-
mediate concern for student safety or the integrity of the education
143. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 303–04.
144. Id. at 304.
145. Id. at 305.
146. CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79 (2010).
147. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 300–01; Peden, supra note 1, at 370.
148. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 308 n.57 (discussing various states’ expansions of
the statutory definition of “weapon” to include items such as explosives, throwing
stars, and air guns (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.7(c)(2) (Michie 1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.466(7)(b) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280
(l)(c)-(e) (West 1995))).
149. Hanson, supra note 11, at 307–08 (“[M]any state and local authorities broadened
zero tolerance policies to encompass not only illegal drug use and possession, but
also legal drugs, including common over-the-counter medications and look-alike
substances.”).
150. Frances P. Solari & Julienne E. M. Balshaw, Outlawed and Exiled: Zero Toler-
ance and Second Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools, 29 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 147, 149 (2007).  Often the regulations proscribing such conduct are
poorly drafted and, thus, vaguely defined. Id. at 149–50.
151. KIM, LOSEN & HEWITT, supra note 146, at 79.  For specific examples of seemingly
benign conduct subjected to zero-tolerance sanctions, see ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
& C.R. PROJECT, HARV. UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING
CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 15 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED].
152. Solari & Balshaw, supra note 150, at 149.
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environment.153  Though the policies, in one sense, can be seen as re-
moving discretion on the part of school officials, the vague definitions
of qualifying acts, such as gang membership, may imbue school offi-
cials with near absolute discretion to remove any students they
choose.154
B. Referral of Students to the Juvenile System for
Misconduct in School
In addition to state legislatures mandating particular sanctions for
various transgressions, forty-three states now require school districts
to refer students to law enforcement for a variety of school policy viola-
tions, many of which would not be considered criminal acts if commit-
ted by adults.155  In the absence of legislative compulsion, such as
mandatory reporting laws, many school districts refer students or
turn over evidence to state authorities as a matter of internal pol-
icy.156  The effect is that students are increasingly finding themselves
in juvenile court or being criminally cited for acts most would consider
typical of adolescent behavior.157
These policies place school officials in an awkward, if not mislead-
ing, position in the life of the student.  The official operates in a non-
adversarial system, presumably working to engage the student in fur-
therance of the student’s best interests and education.  The official
ideally cultivates a relationship of trust and communicates to the stu-
dent that the official is present to assist and better the student.158
However, under mandatory reporting, or even voluntary reporting,
the official may use this trusting relationship to extract as much infor-
153. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 329 (“[A]ctions formerly considered childish or ado-
lescent acts, even actions where there is no violence . . . have taken on or been
given criminal definition, along with criminal consequences.”).
154. See id. at 302 (“Zero tolerance policies have an inherent aspect of absoluteness for
punishment, but paradoxically they also have subjectivity in their definitions of
punishable behaviors.”); Peden, supra note 1, at 371 (“[D]isciplinary policies
termed ‘zero tolerance,’ define punishable behavior in subjective terms.”).  For a
review of constitutional challenges to school discipline regulations for being void
for vagueness, see Solari & Balshaw, supra note 150, at 173–80.
155. OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 151, at 49.  Though most states require
only the reporting of the commission of a crime, often school districts, possibly out
of concern for compliance with state law, will refer students for conduct that does
not necessarily rise to the level of criminal activity. Id.
156. Id.
157. See John R. Emschwiller & Gary Fields, For More Teens, Arrests by Police Re-
place School Discipline, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
for-more-teens-arrests-by-police-replace-school-discipline-1413858602 (relaying
the story of teens whose discipline for acts as benign as water-balloon fights and
science experiments led to arrests and criminal charges).
158. See Hanson, supra note 11, at 325–26 (identifying high school as a critical time in
an adolescent’s life to develop strong bonds with adults).
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mation as possible from the student.159  This information is then
presented to law enforcement acting in an adversarial system to possi-
bly prosecute the student.160
C. The Rise of the School Resource Officer
Though the concept has existed for around seventy years, use of
the school resource officer (SRO)161 exploded in popularity during the
1990s, in part, as a response to school shooting massacres.162  Though
there is limited data as to the number of SROs in America, approxi-
mately 20,000 are on duty in American schools every day.163
The duties of an SRO are a hybrid of traditional law enforcement
responsibilities and educational objectives.  As law enforcement, SROs
patrol school premises, investigate criminal complaints, handle stu-
dents who violate school rules or laws, and respond to student disrup-
tions of the school day and after-school activities.164  As a school-police
liaison, SROs ideally educate students and school staff about the pre-
vention of crime and violence, act as mentors to students, and improve
the juvenile-police relationship at large.165  Often, SROs who are as-
signed to the school environment full-time (“true” SROs)166 receive ex-
tensive training in school-based policing.167
159. Though beyond the scope of this Note, for a fuller overview of public school stu-
dents’ Fourth Amendment rights in school, see Brian J. Fahey, Note, J.P. ex rel.
A.P. v. Millard Public Schools: A Limit on School Authority and What It Means
for Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights in Nebraska, 93 NEB. L. REV. 1012
(2015); Feld, supra note 75; Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of
T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid
Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897 (1988).
160. See OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 151, at 15–16.
161. Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student
Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 280 (2009).  This Note defines “School Resource
Officer” as a law enforcement officer who is specifically assigned to staff, monitor,
or patrol public schools during the school day.
162. Id.  SROs were but one of several types of additional school security measures
that gained popularity at the same time. Id.
163. Id. at 281 (“While it is difficult to know the exact number of school resource of-
ficers, it is estimated that there might be more than 20,000 law enforcement of-
ficers patrolling schools in the United States.”); Emschwiller & Fields, supra note
157 (“The number of school police officers rose 55% to about 19,000 in the 10
years [preceding] 2007.”).
164. See Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforce-
ment Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 991–93
(2009), for a discussion of the various models by which SROs’ school assignments
are structured.
165. Id. at 989–90.
166. Some cases have distinguished between true SROs and “outside” officers and ap-
plied disparate standards of conduct to each. Id. at 985 (citing R.D.S. v. State,
245 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2008); T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
167. See id. at 998–1000 for specific examples of SRO training regimens.
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Though empirical data is limited, studies show that SROs can have
a profound effect on the disciplinary practices of schools.  Schools with
SROs tend to a see a relatively small, though notable, decrease in ar-
rests for weapon possessions.168  Schools regularly staffed by SROs
have students arrested for “disorderly conduct” at more than double
the average rate.169  Lastly, the presence of SROs tends to transform
any investigation of wrongdoing by a school official into a collabora-
tion between the official and the SRO.170  Often, regulations are un-
clear as to which person directs the investigation, and whether the
primary objective is enforcement of the criminal law or maintenance
of the educational environment.171
Despite a growing body of literature raising concerns about the po-
tentially detrimental effects on students of expanded SRO presence,
SROs remain entrenched in schools, if for no other reason than that
SROs serve as additional staff members, almost always at no or rela-
168. Theriot, supra note 161, at 285.  Theriot theorizes that the decrease in weapons
possessions may be due to potential offenders’ fear of arrest if caught, or that
students may feel safer at school because of an officer’s presence and, thus, less of
a need to come to school armed. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Thurau & Wald, supra note 164, at 984 (“The access to SROs for consultation
on whether an act is an arrestable offense increases the likelihood that school
administrators will use such information for police functions.”).
171. Id. at 1006 (“[T]he power of SROs, in conjunction with some principals’ expecta-
tions and pressure for arrest, and in a context with little external oversight, has
led to officers having unprecedented power in deciding who and how to charge,
and into which door of the juvenile justice system the youth will enter . . . .”).
Despite the presence of law enforcement, courts still bypass Fourth Amendment
scrutiny and only require the substantially less rigorous reasonable suspicion
standard to uphold searches as constitutionally valid. KIM, LOSEN & HEWITT,
supra note 146, at 120–21 (citing Shade v. City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054,
1062 (8th Cir. 2002); Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 192 (8th Cir. 1987); Tarter v.
Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983–84 (6th Cir. 1984); Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp.
2d 172, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d
467, 475 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Rudolph ex rel. Williams v. Lowndes Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1114 (M.D. Ala. 2003); In re Angelica D.B., 564
N.W.2d 682, 690–91 (Wis. 1997); In re J.F.M., 607 S.E.2d 304, 307 (N.C. Ct. App,
2005); In re Josue T. 989 P.2d 431, 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Coronado v. State,
835 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).  The Court articulated the reasona-
ble suspicion standard as it applies to school officials in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). See supra note 82.  For specific examples of how low a
threshold “reasonable suspicion” has proven to be, see Martin H. Belsky, Random
vs. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public Schools—A Surprising Civil Lib-
erties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2002) (“How easily is the
‘reasonable suspicion’ test met?  Behavior, hearsay, seemingly innocent com-
ments, and observations can all form legitimate bases for action.  The courts will
most likely accept any articulated basis for a showing of reasonableness.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
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tively little cost to the school district.172  In fact, a minority of school
districts is expanding their delegation of disciplinary authority to law
enforcement.173
IV. THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PIPELINE
A. Counterproductive Results
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the increasingly puni-
tive character of school discipline is its detrimental effects on the pun-
ished student.  Rather than reforming a student’s conduct, thus
enabling the student to perform better academically, sanctions that
remove the student from the school environment generally serve to
deprive the student of his educational interest, force him to fall fur-
ther behind his peers, and cut him off from the ideally supportive com-
munity of friends and teachers.174
Despite the ubiquity of school suspensions and their implicit ap-
proval by the Supreme Court,175 research suggests that suspensions
of students, particularly those served out of school,176 do little to cor-
rect student behavior.177  Further, removing the student from the ed-
ucational environment may simply reinforce resentment in the
student, detach him from the educational environment, and cause him
to fall further behind in his studies.178
Because out-of-school suspension removes the student from the ed-
ucation environment completely, the act essentially places all of the
172. See Thurau & Wald, supra note 164, at 984 (noting that in a case study of sixteen
school districts employing SROs, only one school district paid the entire cost of
the SRO and that SROs were easier to acquire than social workers).
173. OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 151, at 15.
174. See id. at 11 (“[Suspended students] often interpret suspension as a one-way
ticket out of school—a message of rejection that alienates them from ever re-
turning to school.” (quoting Susan Black, Locked Out: Why Suspension and Ex-
pulsion Should Be Your Court of Last Resort, AM. SCH. BOARD J., Jan. 1999, at
36)).
175. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
176. While this Note is primarily concerned with the out-of-school suspension, the
question of whether the increasingly popular in-school suspension functions more
effectively with any statistical significance is the subject of increasing scholar-
ship.  See Neil Blomberg, Effective Discipline for Misbehavior: In School vs. Out
of School Suspension, 27 CONCEPT: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY J. OF GRADUATE STUD.
1 (2004), for a comparison of non-repeat referral rates, academic performance,
and drop-out rates between students subject to in-school versus out-of-school
suspensions.
177. See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE
DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 8 (2012).
178. Peden, supra note 1, at 371 (“We should not minimize the effect that expulsion or
suspension from school has on a young life.  Aside from interrupting a student’s
academic progress, removal from school for any appreciable time as a disciplinary
penalty can deprive her of the society of her peers just as incarceration does the
criminal . . . .”).
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blame for the misconduct on the student, rather than the school dis-
trict for failing to instill the proper behavior.179  Consequently, the
school district has no cause to examine its own policies and behavior
in its treatment of the child leading up to or following the suspension
or expulsion.180  Additionally, students whose inappropriate behavior
may be at least partially attributable to factors in their home environ-
ment are further exposed to the environment without any additional
support.181
The Advancement Project’s report, “Opportunities Suspended,”
cited two primary development goals of the education system for the
individual student: “the development of strong and trusting relation-
ships with key adults in their lives, particularly those in their schools”
and “the formation of positive attitudes towards fairness and jus-
tice.”182  The study concluded that exclusionary discipline policies
“often further alienate students from school and exacerbate the behav-
iors they seek to remedy.”183
B. Disproportionate Effect on Minority and Learning-
Disabled Students
While exclusionary school discipline policies may be ineffective in
reforming student conduct, they also tend to be visited upon minority
student groups disproportionately.  Statistical research has shown
that students of color are subjected to suspensions and expulsions at a
higher rate than their white peers.184  Students of color who are re-
ferred or reported to juvenile court are also at risk of disproportionate
179. Blomberg, supra note 176, at 2–4.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3 (discussing the urging of health professionals to limit out-of-school sus-
pensions to help identify students needing treatment for depression, abuse, or
mental illness); see Sheryl A. Hemphill et al., The Effect of School Suspensions
and Arrests on Subsequent Adolescent Antisocial Behavior in Australia and the
United States, 39 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 736, 741 (2006) (concluding that sub-
jecting students to suspension increases antisocial behavior at a statistically sig-
nificant rate).
182. OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 151, at 10.
183. Id.  What is more, students who are reintroduced to the educational environment,
either from a school suspension or from the juvenile justice system, face often
insurmountable challenges in succeeding academically.  See Feierman, Levick &
Mody, supra note 135, for a thorough discussion of these challenges and their
possible solutions.
184. See Blomberg, supra note 176, at 4 (noting that, as a percentage of enrollment,
12.9% of black students were subjected to suspensions, compared to only 5.5% of
white students); Smith, supra note 8, at 1011 (“In some states, more than thirty
percent of the black student population is suspended each year.”); Solari & Bal-
shaw, supra note 150, at 150 (“African-American children represent 17% of public
school enrollment nationwide, but 33% of all out-of-school suspensions.  White
students, on the other hand, represent 63% of public school enrolment, but only
50% of out-of-school suspensions.”).
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referral to adult criminal court.185  Such referrals, even if they do not
result in a conviction, may create a paper trail that is difficult to ex-
punge and easily discovered by potential employers or institutions of
higher education.186
Additionally, students with learning disabilities are frequently
subjected to removal from the educational environment.187  This
should not be surprising given that the most common cause for re-
moval is not violent offenses, but disruptive behavior.188  Students
with certain learning disabilities and behavioral disorders are obvi-
ously more likely to display such behavior than their unafflicted peers;
however these students have found little redress for their exclusion,
even where the school’s own failure to accommodate the disabled child
may be partially responsible.189  The end result of these exclusionary
policies is that students who may already be at an academic disadvan-
tage, through no fault of their own, find their challenges compounded
as they fall further behind their peers academically and become fur-
ther isolated from their support socially.
C. Discipline Without a Purpose
Given the apparent ineffectiveness of the retributive trends in
school discipline at reforming student behavior,190 ascertaining the
actual purpose of these policies becomes a critical task.  These policies
can be examined from two purposive perspectives: their purpose as to
the student sanctioned or as to the educational environment as a
whole.191
Given that mounting empirical evidence indicates these policies do
not effectively reform the conduct of the sanctioned student,192 the
185. See JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 65, at 5 (finding that in nine out of ten jurisdictions
studied, African-American juveniles were disproportionately charged in adult
criminal court compared to their white peers).
186. See Emschwiller & Fields, supra note 157 (“Arrest records, even when charges
are dropped, often trail youngsters into adulthood.  Records, especially for teen-
agers tried as adults, have become more accessible on the Internet, but are often
incomplete or inaccurate.  Employers, banks, college admissions officers and
landlords, among others, routinely check records online.”).
187. See generally Rivkin, supra note 8 (describing specific cases representative of the
myriad of ways that typical conduct by students with behavioral disorders can
get these students excluded from the learning environment).
188. Smith, supra note 8, at 1013.
189. Rivkin, supra note 8, at 944 (“[C]ourts have yet to find a significant obstacle to
the exclusion of children with disabilities . . . even where . . . the school’s own
failures caused the behavior being reported, and even where the school’s subjec-
tive intention was to exclude the child.”).
190. See supra notes 174–83.
191. This bifurcation corresponds to the Supreme Court’s identification in Ingraham
of the states’ power to educate their citizens and maintain the educational envi-
ronment in order to do so. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1976).
192. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
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logical conclusion is that the policies are implemented and expanded
because they effectively preserve the educational environment.193
The implication as to state education priorities is concerning.
To the extent these policies are effected to preserve the educational
environment, they essentially sacrifice one student’s educational in-
terest for the preservation of another’s, i.e., one student is removed so
that the education of other students may continue.194  Continued im-
plementation and augmentation195 of these policies represent a con-
scious decision by state officials to prioritize the education of certain
groups of students over others.  Considering that students removed
from the education environment are disproportionately minority and
learning-disabled,196 this prioritization is particularly troubling for
America’s democratic vitality.
With serious doubts as to their effectiveness at reforming student
conduct and maintaining the educational environment, the exclusion-
ary policies discussed in this Note appear increasingly unmoored from
any articulated purpose.  In this sense, these exclusionary policies
hearken back to the punitive framework articulated in subsection
II.A.2.197  School exclusionary discipline practices have always borne
certain qualities enumerated in the framework,198 but given their os-
tensible purpose,199 such a comparison may have seemed absurd in
the past.200  However, assuming further empirical evidence corre-
sponds to the current body of work, showing these exclusionary prac-
tices ineffective for their ostensible purpose,201 such practices will
appear increasingly “arbitrary and purposeless”202 and, thus, poten-
193. Empirical evidence casts doubt on whether exclusionary sanctions even accom-
plish the task of maintaining the educational environment for the benefit of bet-
ter-behaving students, who remain in school. See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note
177, at 8 (“[R]esearchers find that the frequent use of suspension brings no bene-
fits in terms of test scores or graduation rates [for the student body as a whole].”).
194. See supra note 193.
195. For evidence of the increasing number of students punished under these policies,
see OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 151, at 48.
196. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
198. Certainly, various school exclusionary discipline policies, such as suspension, fit
some of the criteria in the framework—such a sanction is determinate and im-
posed because of an offense. See supra note 27 (enumerating two of the punitive
characteristics as whether the sanction’s duration is known at imposition and
whether it is imposed because of an offense).  For a discussion of whether school
exclusionary policies may be considered retributive in their purpose, see infra
note 203.
199. See supra note 191.
200. See supra note 112 for a discussion of the Court’s treatment of the idea of school
discipline as criminal punishment.
201. See supra notes 174–89 and accompanying text.
202. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); see supra notes 28–29 and accompany-
ing text.
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tially more retributive in character.203  Even if these sanctions are
recognized as more punitive in character, students, especially those of
particular minority groups and those suffering from certain disabili-
ties,204 will continue to enjoy virtually no constitutional protection
from the imposition of these policies.205
V. CONCLUSION
Students in public school today may be sanctioned through three
distinct theoretical models: the Criminal Punishment Model, the Ju-
venile Justice Model, or the School Discipline Model.  Depending upon
the applicable model, the student will be entitled to a particular set of
constitutional protections.  While those adjudicated under the Crimi-
nal Punishment Model enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protec-
tions,206 the rights attendant to the Juvenile Justice and School
Discipline Models are more limited.  Though the Supreme Court has
extended a number of constitutional protections to juveniles adjudi-
cated through the Juvenile Justice Model,207 it has struggled to define
its role in regulating the authority of public school officials to disci-
pline students for conduct occurring within school.208  The end result
is that while public school students enjoy limited constitutional rights
while in school, school officials have near total discretion in disciplin-
ing students.209
Though only the Criminal Punishment Model’s foundational pur-
pose is characterized as primarily retributive,210 both the Juvenile
Justice Model and the School Discipline Model have grown increas-
203. As discussed supra note 112, the Court in Ingraham saw the idea of school disci-
pline as wholly incomparable to retributive criminal sanctions.  However, the im-
age the Court painted was a far cry from newer, more severe forms of
exclusionary discipline, such as the zero-tolerance policies discussed supra sec-
tion III.A.  These policies, in mandating removal for a specific offense, allow no
consideration for the needs or particular circumstances of the accused. See
Peden, supra note 1, at 371 (“[Zero-tolerance] carries with it a connotation of ab-
solutism and inflexibility which implies that once parameters of conduct have
been established for any particular institution, no activity which occurs outside
those parameters will be allowed.”).  Certainly, zero-tolerance and other exclu-
sionary policies for offenses, such as gun possession, may be viewed as regula-
tions to maintain the safety of schools.  However, the expansion of zero-tolerance
policies to include non-violent offenses, see supra notes 147–52 and accompanying
text, casts doubt that safety is the sole underlying purpose of such sanctions.
Though other motivations may be plausibly argued, retribution appears as an
increasingly plausible underlying motivation.
204. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
205. See supra section II.C.
206. See supra subsection II.A.1.
207. See supra subsection II.B.2.
208. See supra subsection II.C.2.
209. See supra subsection II.C.3.
210. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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ingly retributive over the past fifty years.211  The Juvenile Justice
Model’s retributive transmogrification from its rehabilitative begin-
nings has primarily been caused by state policies that impose determi-
nate sentencing and increase ease of waiver for juveniles from juvenile
to criminal court.212  The School Discipline Model has grown more re-
tributive through its use of zero-tolerance policies, its referral of stu-
dents to the Juvenile Justice Model, and its increased use of law
enforcement officials in maintaining school discipline.213  These
trends have become colloquially labeled the school-to-prison
pipeline.214
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that these polices
do not improve the subject student’s conduct.215  Rather, they tend to
exacerbate the disruptive conduct that incurred the exclusionary
sanction initially and substantially hinder the student’s academic pro-
gress.216  Additionally, research suggests these policies, which remove
the purportedly disruptive element, may not even improve the school
environment for the remaining students.217  Consequently, these ex-
clusionary discipline policies can be seen as partially, or even prima-
rily, retributive in their purpose.218  This leaves public school
students in the worst of both worlds, as they are subjected to prima-
rily punitive sanctions with only a modicum of the constitutional pro-
tections mandated for such punishment under the Juvenile and
Criminal Models.
211. See supra subsection II.B.3 and Part III.
212. See supra subsection II.B.3
213. See supra Part III.
214. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
215. See supra section IV.A.
216. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 193.
218. See supra section IV.C.
